written for a class on Jeffrey Gurock’s Orthodox Jews in America
It occurred to me that while some European immigrants were moving to what was then Palestine, the less-committed ones were those coming to America. So although America was likely a catalyst, the lack of observance among these immigrants “began well before they actually considered taking that first step toward America” (95). They were interested in political freedom and religious equality, not necessarily religious expression. The next wave of immigrants, escaping the war, were not especially motivated by those things, to say the least. (I think a person’s characterization of these immigrants can say a lot about him; for example, from Joseph Telushkin I learned that they were completely neurotic, compared to the less-observant normal/baseline previous immigrants.) Having come in during a period of contentment did not bode well with those already in America, and so it began.
It is not very hard to see that the possibility of feminism being the next contentious development in Orthodoxy is consistent with its history of internal dissonance. It is not surprising that feminism is being blamed for the ills of Jewry, nor that it is called a “chillul hashem” (289). Lately, the battle is being fought over women’s tefillah groups, but the problem could just as easily have been the mixed choirs or mixed seating that previously characterized conscious or unconscious splits from Orthodoxy. With that as a precedent, those who predict another split due to the feminist issue could very well turn out to be right.
Different groups have taken care of this issue in different ways. For example, Lincoln Square Synagogue began a kind of “resocialization process” meant for baalot teshuva (251). Although it is Modern Orthodox, its program is meant to emphasize “women’s role” in Judaism, which actually turns out to be relevant for the many women who “return to Judaism” out of a search for stability and family rather than for egalitarianism. The same language was actually used in this process as was used in the ultra-Orthodox Beis Chana house, also designed for baalot teshuva. (I recommend Lynn Davidman’s book as a sociological look at women baalot teshuva in both environments in the early 90′s. The two groups are really very similar in rhetoric and ideology.) Those who prefer this process would reject the opposition as perpetuating a “mitzvah culture” that doesn’t regard Judaism as a complete lifestyle, “women’s role” and all (258-60). There are “two flavors of people,” male and female (280). Specific halacha not required (also, specifical personality traits not required, apparently). “Halachic values,” such as unity of weltenshauung, are essential, rather than “halachic details.”
Interestingly enough, these words were used to argue against feminism and women’s tefillah groups (288). On the surface, it is easy to agree that the “values” of egalitarianism are driving such women, which may be true for less developed groups, but for what it’s worth, groups such as Shira Hadasha and Yeshivat Maharat (related to Hebrew Institute of Riverdale) have halachic sources and authorities available from which they derive their decisions. In fact, I might argue that they rely heavily on “halachic details” rather than “values.” In those groups that define themselves as “traditional,” one will not likely find “because it’s more fair this way!” as an argument, as one might find in Conservative sources.
Because technically nothing bars women from being rabbis but public acceptance of the title “rabbi,” a variety of programs have started to allow women to become more educated to the point where they could, in theory, be qualified to make halachic decisions. In the realm of niddah and other marital concerns, rebbetzins have been doing this already without training (283). It ends the “anarchy,” as a Rabbi Neumark once said while considering ordaining Reform women in a 1922 discussion. (“Women are already doing most of the work that the ordained woman rabbi is expected to do,” he writes, “but they do it without preparation and without authority.”) This makes me question the real seriousness of this “training,” but I suppose it’s a start.
As these two groups duel, strange things get said, such as “the practice of women praying privately is permitted, if not encouraged under Jewish law” (275), said by Gurock himself, or Soloveitchik concluding that although women may be permitted to pray in a group (not a minyan, mind you) only after they have fulfilled “lengthy philosophical criteria” which would be admittedly impossible “even for men” to fulfill (285). Women are treated as a special interest group now (302), and although this may have taken place before, now that it has the attention of everyone, women cannot do much of anything out of the ordinary without it possibly being seen as some kind of insurgency.
I’m not sure how secure the parallel is, though, between those already in America who were “less observant” and the “devout newcomers” (51); and between those for or against feminism. Something happened, which Gurock briefly mentions but doesn’t explain, around the 60′s and 70′s that led many people to see Orthodoxy as a viable alternative once again. Somehow, it was revitalized, and it was out of this that the women’s “movement” in Orthodoxy took place, as opposed to being a consequence of sacrificing observance for acceptance or Americanization. Of course, feminism is criticized as bringing “the ways of the gentiles” into Judaism, but in a way if it came about differently than did other changes (such as mixed seating), perhaps the outcome will be different as well.
Similar to how different groups deal with feminism, I thought the rabbis’ and official synagogues’ reactions to nonobservance may have had something to do with the synagogue-based culture that seemingly dominates today. For example, “rather than speaking sternly of halachic violations, the message was that it was just poor etiquette to behave inappropriately in public religious settings” (155). This is characteristic of the Conservative movement, which “did not criticize [congregants'] personal patterns of observance” (203).
When halachic observance is turned into “urging” and “insisting” solely for the sake of others in the synagogue, it implicitly encourages that kind of surface-level observance to remain inside the synagogue. After a few generations, I would be surprised if this conduct was not said to be characteristic of the Conservative movement. Indeed, “all that Conservative rabbis asked of their members was that they be regular worshippers” (203). With the idea that getting to and participating in the synagogue was of primary importance, the “driving teshuva” made perfect sense. However, with this idea also inherently comes the idea that observance is a “choice,” not something I’m sure some Conservative leaders would admit or appreciate, but in any case the “religious voluntarism undermines rabbinic authority,” also characteristic of the Conservative movement.


Now, let’s look at this. I know that medicine at that time was probably compatible with the idea that menses is an illness. And TMI, I’m not exactly disagreeing with the previous statement “no woman sees blood of the menses without her head and limbs being heavy on her” (§166). But earlier, the author writes that menses is indicative of an “excess” being present, and same for the uncleanness after childbirth. It’s interesting because the previous theory that I heard came from my Protestant Biblical criticism teacher, who said that niddah was a way of being “hyper-ordered,” so that’s why you couldn’t go near holy (i.e. ordered) things.


Last summer, I wrote
